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INTRODUCTION

This article is about an island in the Caribbean that is only ninety miles
from the United States. This article is about Cuba where a totalitarian regime
has charted that country's economic course for the last thirty-six years. It
discusses the legal, economic, moral, and ethical alternatives faced by foreign
corporations and individuals considering investment in Cuba.

* Professor of Finance, Florida International University; Ph.D., M.B.A., Florida State
University; B.S., Florida Atlantic University.
** Professor of Accounting and Management, Florida International University; D.B.A.,
Florida State University; M.B.A., B.B.A., University of Miami.
*** Authors' note: This article is dedicated to our parents - our bond to the past, our
wives, and to our children - our link to the future.-
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THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT

There are few countries in the world today where one can find a more
unsatisfactory legal environment than in Cuba. From its genesis, the current
regime in Cuba has proceeded to disregard and violate both Cuban and
International Law. Some examples will suffice:
(1) On February 7, 1959, a new Fundamental Law was promulgated that
encompassed the following changes to the then existing Constitution:
a. establishing the retroactivity of the penal code;
b. ratifying and expanding the ability of the government to confiscate
property;
c. approving the death penalty; and
d. suspending the tenure and independence of the Judicial Power and
Attorney General.'
(2)
On February 13, 1959, the Organic Law of Ministry in Charge of the
Recovery of Ill-Obtained Property was enacted. This law gave the
right to proceed with the confiscation of property without judicial
participation.2
(3)
On May 17, 1959, the Law of Agrarian Reform was enacted. This law
affected two fundamental aspects of existing Cuban law. It authorized
expropriation without compensation and excluded the existing
Judiciary from the expropriation process.3
(4) On June 29, 1959, there was another Constitutional Reform creating
so-called counterrevolutionary crimes that were punishable by death.4
(5)
On July 7, 1959, as a result of Law No. 425, a number of new
"counterrevolutionary crimes" were identified, many of them requiring
the death penalty.'
(6)
On October 29, 1959, the Revolutionary Tribunals were reestablished
6
on a permanent basis.
(7)
On December 23, 1959, Law No. 664 established the automatic
confiscation of the property of all individuals found guilty of
counterrevolutionary acts.7
(8)
After June 1962, all persons leaving or suspected of planning to leave

1. LEY FUNDAMENTAL, published in Gareta Official, at 1 (Feb. 7, 1959) (Cuba).
2. GRUPO CUBANO DE INVESTIGACIONEs EcoNOMICAS DE UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI, UN

EsTuDIo SOBRE CUBA 1585 (1963 University of Miami Press) [hereinafter GRUPO CUBANO
DE INVESTIGACIONES].

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Id. at 1585-86.
Id. at 1586.
Id.
Id. at 1587.
Id.
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the country are required to have their property inventoried; and at the
time of departure, it is confiscated by the government. The inventory
of property includes even small personal effects, such as clothes,
jewelry, and shoes. Persons leaving Cuba are allowed to take with
them only one pair of shoes and four changes of clothes.8
(9)
On July 5, 1960, a subsequent modification to the Constitution
reduced even further the individual rights of citizens and expanded the
power of the government to confiscate property without judicial
participation or payment. 9
(10) During July, August, and September of 1960, through Law No. 851
and Presidential Resolutions No. 1 and No. 2, the expropriation of
foreign-owned property in Cuba took place.'0
(11)
On October 14, 1960, the Constitutional Law of Urban Reform was
issued affecting the ownership of rented property. The creation of a
Supreme Court of Urban Reform was decreed, and the regular
Judiciary was blocked from exercising jurisdiction on the matter."
(12)
Resolution No. 3 of October 24, 1960, resulted in the expropriation
without compensation of the remaining foreign-and privately-owned2
commercial, industrial, and service enterprises in the country.
Subsequent measures of nationalization have included expropriation
of Cuban companies.
(13)
December 20, 1960, brought more constitutional reform with grave
implications for the administration of justice in Cuba. Among the
changes were the following:
a. Retroactive laws were implemented, taking away individual rights;
b. The composition of the Supreme Court was changed. The naming
and promotion of all members of the Supreme Court, that is, judges,
magistrates, and court members, was to be made directly by the
President of Cuba; and
c. The suspension of tenure for judicial officers
and of the indepen3
dence of the Judicial Power was extended.1
This last constitutional reform gave the government the opportunity to decree
the firing of the President of the Supreme Court and fourteen other members
of that body.' 4

8. Id.
9. Id. at 1588.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1588-89. It is interesting to note that in order to serve in the "Supreme Court
of Urban Reform" one was not required to be a lawyer or to have any legal training
whatsoever.
12. Id. at 1589.
13. Id.
14. See id.
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These series of laws, resolutions, and decrees made the Judicial, Power
totally dependent on the Executive Branch and completely subjugated the
former to the official policy of the latter. This decreased the independence
of the Judicial Power. Further, the existence of Revolutionary Tribunals
increasingly eroded the domain of the regular Judiciary.1"
The resulting legal structure in Cuba is subverted by a system that places
all crime and punishment into a political context. According to Matias
Travieso-Diaz, a partner in the Washington, D.C. law firm of Shaw, Pittman,
Potts and Trowbridge and the director of the firm's Cuba Project:
[S]ocialist legality in a nutshell is a system without a constant set of
rules..... It is subservient to the political agenda of the government
...
[T]he laws are interpreted at a given time in the way that
conforms to the political needs of the
government at a given time.
6
You don't have a firm set of rules.'
An example of this subservience of the rule of law to political whims is
contained in Act 8 of the Cuban Penal Code. Act 8 states that the "formal
concept of crime" is irrelevant to the Cuban judicial system. 7 This
principle can be seen at work in the Ley de Peligrosidad (the Law of
Dangerousness), a vaguely defined statute that allows the arrest and
prosecution of anyone considered, however slightly, to be a criminal,
economic, social, or political misfit.'8 For example, under this Act, Cubans
can be arrested for simply entering the house of a known political dissident.' 9
Another example of the subversion of the rule of law can be seen in
Cuba's legal education system. Prior to the Castro regime, the University of
Havana had been the core of resistance to all previous authoritarian regimes
in Cuba. This was the case during the time of President Machado in the
early 1930s and of President Batista in the late 1950s. As a result of actions
by the Castro government, the University of Havana, in particular the Law
School and the School of Commercial Sciences (Business), became centers
of opposition to the government.
In April 1960, the government began its effort to undermine the
autonomy and independence of the University. These efforts reached a
climax on July 15, 1960, when the Junta Superior de Gobierno, a group of

15. GRUPO CUBANO DE INVESTIGACIONES, supra note 2, at 1589.
16. Patrick Symmes, Where the Concept of Crime Is "Irrelevant" to Justice, DAILY Bus.
REv., June 16, 1995, at A8.
17. Id.

18. Id.
19. Id.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol9/iss3/4
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three professors and three students, who with the support of the government,
assumed control of the University by force. 20 After July 15, 1960 dozens
of faculty were fired. This was the end of the university's autonomy, as well
as academic freedom and open opposition to the Castro regime. 21 The Law
School faculty paid a particularly heavy price for its leadership in defending
the autonomy of the university. Loss of jobs, confiscation of property, exile,
and prison was the fate of many Cuban academicians. Because all graduates
from the University of Havana and its law school must pass Castro's
ideological requirements, investors must be concerned about any legal advice
they receive from Cuban lawyers.
III.

FOREIGN INVESTMENT

Investors must understand the legal environment established by the
current Cuban government in order to properly assess the risks associated
with investing in Cuba. Because the Cuban government acquired property
through expropriation without compensation, all current property titles in the
country are suspect. Acquisition of property, commercial or industrial, will
most likely be subject to challenge in the future by its previous owners.
Among these previous owners are U.S. citizens who have filed claims with
the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission in Washington, D.C. Currently,
8816 claims by these individuals for a total asserted amount of $US3.3
billion (1960 value) have been made against the Cuban government.22 In
addition, an estimated $US100 billion of Cuban private property has been
seized and has not been paid for by the Castro regime. It should be expected
that if a change of government takes place in Cuba, these owners their heirs
or successors will exert their rights to recover their property.
The current lack of an independent Judiciary also poses problems. The
submission of the Judiciary, vis-A-vis the Executive, bodes ill for any firm
that invests in Cuba and encounters any kind of legal confrontation with the
government. Furthermore, there are no independent lawyers or independent
certified public accountants, at least not as we know them in the United
States. Lawyers and accountants in Cuba are government functionaries,
fulfilling the role assigned to them by the state.
Finally, a totalitarian government that has once expropriated without
compensation might well do it again, when and if it feels that it is in its best
interest. There is no free congress or parliament, no independent judiciary,

20. AURELIO FERNANDEZ DiAz, NACIMIENTO: DESARROLLO Y MUERTE DEL CONTADOR
PUBLICO EN CUBA 52-53 (1992).
21. Id.

22. LYNN DARRELL BENDER, THE POLITICS OF HOSTILITY: CASTRO'S REVOLUTION AND
UNITED STATES POLICY 101 (1975).
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1994
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no freely expressed public opinion, no free press, and no opposition party
that could resist such a move. Simply put, there are no checks and balances
to the total power of one individual and one party.
A.

Why Cuba Wants Foreign Investment at This lime

From 1959 until 1989, Castro connected the destiny of Cuba and his
regime to that of the Soviet Union. In return for substantial economic aid,
estimated at US$65 billion between 1960 and 1990, Cuba served as a
military base for the Soviet Union during the Cold War and cooperated handin-glove with the strategic objectives of that superpower.23 Cuba's economy
went into a free-fall with the breakup of the Soviet Union between 1989 and
1990. Cuba lost its major commercial markets together with the Soviet
subsidies it had been receiving. According to estimates published by The
Economist Intelligence Unit in its publication, Cuba: Prospectsfor Reform
Trade and Investment, 4 Cuba's GNP dropped from US$32.5 billion in
1989 to US$18.6 billion in 1994.25 Total exports also dropped from US$5.4
billion to US$1.7 billion during that same period.26 Cuba's sugar crop
dropped from 7 million tons in 1991-92 to 4 million tons in 1993-94. The
1994-95 sugar crop only reached 3.4 million tons, according to Cuban
economists.2 7 Faced with an accelerated economic deterioration and an
increasing rise of popular dissatisfaction, Cuba's decision makers have been
forced to look elsewhere for hard currency.
B.

Cuba's Economic Background

When talking about the Cuban economy of this decade, it must be
understood that the 1990s represent another shock to the Cuban economy, the
second such shock in thirty years.28 From 1961 through 1989, even though
it was provided with large Soviet subsidies, the Cuban economy went
through one of the worst economic periods in its history. Up until 1958,
every Cuban president since World War II presided over an average annual
growth rate of four percent or higher. These presidents also initiated growth

23. CARMELO MESA-LAGO, BREVE HISTORIA ECONOMICA
Brief Economic History of Socialist Cuba] 229 (1994).

DE LA CUBA SOCIALISTA

[A

24. GARETH JENKINS & LILA HAINES, CUBA: PROSPECTS FOR REFORM TRADE AND

INVESTMENT 4 (Tbl. 1.1) (1994).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Zafra de Cuba es la mis baja en 50 afios segtn cifra oficial, EL NUEvO HERALD,
June 19, 1995, at IB, 2B.
28. Raul Moncarz, Cuban Dynamics, in CUBA IN A CHANGING WORLD 53, 53-59
(Antonio Jorge et al. eds., 1991); conversations with Antonio Jorge, Res. Inst. for Cuban Stud.,
in Miami, Fla. (May-June 1995).
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in new areas such as rice, tourism, and mining, all designed to diversify the
29
economy.
It is important to recognize that the deterioration of the Cuban economy
started in 1961, and that the events of 1989 simply worsened an already
degenerated economic situation. In 1961, the economy contracted, industrial
growth stopped, and the average wage earner's purchasing power fell. This
trend has continued over time, as has the lack of diversification, a problem
that has plagued the Cuban economy since the 1920s. For instance, sugar
remains the most important export commodity. However, with its ever
decreasing productivity since 1961, the rest of the economy is suffering and
paying the price of a command economy.30 In addition, this command
economy is still functioning in Cuba as it pertains to the internal sector. The
government has a monopoly on the Cuban market, and no change nor
thought of change is anticipated. All reforms are directed toward the external
sector.
In 1989, the Cuban economy experienced a number of difficulties due to
the nature of the regime's authoritarian style and preference for political and
grandiose projects. Up to that year, in great part due to the Soviet subsidies,
Cuba was able to intervene militarily, economically, and politically in many
parts of the world. In addition, the Soviets looked at Cuba with compassionate eyes, more or less like an uncle looks at his favorite nephew. Thus,
they gave this nephew subsidies and a place in the world unlike any given
to their own citizens or to other Soviet Republics.
By 1989, the Soviet Union could no longer support the Cuban economy.
Without Soviet fuel, machinery, fertilizers, technical help, and subsidies,
Cuba's economy deteriorated even further, but this time at a geometric pace.
Sugar production fell by at least fifty percent. Factories did not have the
needed inputs and were idled while continuing to pay workers their salaries.
Production and morale fell even more, resulting in the now famous blackouts
and ever increasing rationing process. In 1990, the Cuban government began
move toward opening the economy once again. However, this time it began
to look for new trading partners and seemed to welcome foreign capital.
The loss of subsidization meant a drastic reduction in investments and a
significant deterioration of the capital stock. There was a clear inability to
raise capital above a replacement level that would help reverse the economic
decline. In 1991, unfinished investment projects equaled three times the
amount of new investment.3 1

29. Moncarz, supra note 28, at 53.
30. Id.

31.

See G. ZUIKOW ET AL., INFORME SOBRE LA ECONOMIA DE CUBA (1991).
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32
By 1992, initial steps were taken to open up the state-run economy.

Foreign investments are allowed in the form of joint ventures with the Cuban
regime.33 The Cuban government has announced that this opening of the
34
economy has brought more than US$1.5 billion in foreign investments.
The government also has legalized the possession of foreign currency, and
the U.S. dollar circulates as a second currency.
Since 1993, the country has legalized some self-employment in
specifically sanctioned jobs.35 Cuba now allows farmers to sell some of
their excess produce after fulfilling their assigned quota. Further, the Cuban
government announced on June 14, 1995 that it would allow people to open
small family-run restaurants, a move designed to widen its tiny private sector
and provide more opportunities for self-employment. 36 The law stresses that
the restaurants may employ only family members. The law sets the
maximum restaurant size at twelve seats and includes hefty taxes, which
could put a brake on the proliferation of such private restaurants.37
With these new measures, there are now 154 legally recognized
categories, including bicycle repairman, parking lot attendant, hairdresser,
house pet groomer, spark plug cleaning, inspecting services, taxi drivers, and
vendors.38 In the last three years, 160,000 Cubans have been licensed to
work for themselves, and according to Cuban government and academic
estimates, another 150,000 work without licenses. 39 However, at this time,
these activities are unlikely to create many additional jobs.4 ° This longawaited reform falls short of many people's expectations by failing to allow
university-trained professionals, such as doctors and teachers, to be selfemployed.4' There was an income tax hike for people working in twentyfive of the self-employment fields.42 Such minute details reflect the
continuing desire of Cuban authorities to maintain as much control as
possible over people working outside the government sector. Additionally,
no one knows how long this new attitude will last or how the rules of the
game might change with respect to self-employment.

32. Howard LaFranchi, Rumba of Revolt Felt in Castro's Cuba, CHRISTIAN SCi. MONITOR,
June 6, 1995, at 1, 5.

33. Id. at 5.
34. Id.
35. Cuba Broadens Range of Self-Employment Categories; Many Still Excluded, Agence
France Presse, June 13, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AFPFR File.
36. Frances Kerry, Cuba Allows Small Private Restaurants,Reuters Ltd., June 14, 1995,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, REUNA File.
37. Id.
38. Cuba Broadens Range of Self-Employment Categories, supra note 35.
39. LaFranchi, supra note 32, at 5.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol9/iss3/4
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According to an article in the Miami Herald, a draft of Cuba's new
foreign investment law allows up to 100% foreign ownership of Cuban
enterprises.4 3 One reason for the new foreign investment law is that the
level of foreign investment has begun to slow down. The new law reportedly
will allow foreigners to hold a majority stake in enterprises. Investors will
be able to hire Cuban employees directly rather than having to go through a
government agency. In addition, the process for reviewing investment
proposals will be streamlined, the tax structure will be simplified, and lastly,
real estate investments will be allowed. If the past is any indicator for the
future, the new laws will fall far short of expectations by failing to recognize
that the only way to change the Cuban economy is through structural
changes.
Despite the cosmetic changes attempted by the government, the command
economy is still functioning in Cuba as it pertains to its internal sector. The
government has a monopoly in the Cuban market; there has been no change
in that sector. The only sector that has changed is the external sector to
which all reforms are directed. On the other hand, the tourists and the
international businesses who are coming to Cuba are not only bringing in
hard currency, but also stimulating new ideas and views, a new openness to
change, and a willingness to try new solutions by some of its leaders and
institutions.'
C.

Opportunitiesfor Foreign Investors in Cuba

Cuba is rolling out the welcome carpet for foreign investors, opening up
a number of areas such as, oil, tourism, and mining. For instance, Sherritt
of Canada produces one-third of Cuba's oil.45 Sherritt also has investments
in mining such as nickel.46 Most investment deals are joint ventures, and
with few exceptions, Cuba maintains a majority share.
Cuba wants to lure foreign companies to participate in fourteen oil
exploration blocks to bolster production. Therefore, beginning in 1990, it has
opened the Cuban petroleum industry to foreign involvement. Under the
production-sharing deals being offered, which must be signed with the Cuban
government and its corresponding state company, foreign companies pay
taxes of thirty percent on profits and twenty-five percent on salaries paid to
Cuban employees. Firms can sell their shares of oil internationally or to a

43. Mimi Whitefield, Draft of Cuba's Law Allows 100% Foreign Ownership, MIAMI
June 16, 1995, at IC, 3C.
44. Moneyline: US. Remains Only Isolated Country from Cuba (CNN television
broadcast, June 2, 1995), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CNN File.
45. Bernard Simon & Pascal Fletcher, Havana Welcome Warms Up as Sherritt Snubs
Washington on Trade, FIN. TIMEs, Nov.17, 1995, International Company News, at 26, 26.
46. Id.
HERALD,
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Cuban company at market prices without being charged export taxes.47
Mexico's Grupo Domos is investing US$1.5 billion for the .ight to
modernize Cuba's telephone system, a deal the company says is worth every
penny."8 Further, COMSAT World Systems has had to increase its
telecommunications support system to meet current demands in Cuba.49
The telecommunications industry in Cuba needs the most capital to be able
to modernize the economy. Only major investment can bring the system up
to international standards. The agreements signed with Mexico have taken
care of short-term difficulties rather than the long-term difficulty of
structurally changing the system to fit world standards.
In order to sell retail in Cuba, one must enter into a licensing agreement
with the government. The licensing agreement is good for the Cuban
government because it gets to keep sixty percent of the profits. Cuba
requires its international partners to pay for workers in hard currency, usually
U.S. dollars. The government keeps these dollars to bolster its cash reserves,
paying out only two percent to the workers in Cuban pesos. This equals
approximately 171 pesos a month, the same amount earned by a sales clerk
who works for a Cuban government.
Why are tourists attracted to Cuba? Cuba is seen as a forbidden fruit, a
place to be before everybody else comes to the island. In addition, Cuba is
inexpensive. In 1994, 619,000 tourists visited Cuba, and they had an average
stay of 10.6 days, the longest of any other country in the Caribbean region.
In 1994 Cuba earned US$750 million. The number of tourists has doubled
since 1989. Tourism is one of the few industries that is growing. Cuba
hopes to surpass two million tourists by the year 2000. To accommodate
these visitors the government and foreign investors have initiated the
construction of additional room capacity. At this time, seventeen international air carriers operate in seven international airports providing service
to Cuba.
The Cuban government hopes that the participation of foreign capital will
play an important role in the development of the tourist industry. In 1995,
1700 rooms, both new and renovated, were run by joint ventures between the
Cuban government and firms from Spain, Mexico, Germany, Canada, and
Italy. At the same time, tens of thousands more rooms have been slated for
construction or are in an advanced process of negotiation.

47. BrighterLicense Terms Rekindle Interest in Cuban Coastal Zones, OFFSHORE (Jan.
1, 1996), available in Westlaw, 1996 WL 9439177.
48. See The Big Deals, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 1995, at R12.
49. Cuba: COMSA T/MCI Expand Accord, 11 CARIBBEAN UPDATE 10 (Nov. 1, 1995),
available in Westlaw, 1995 WL 11631200.
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IV.

IMPORTANT CONCERNS FOR FOREIGN INVESTORS

In addition to the traditional characteristics of interest rates and expected
returns on investments associated with them, prospective investors should
look at other variables that affect investments in Cuba. These variables
include human rights, property claims against the government, the U.S.
embargo, the political risk involved in such an investment, and the moral and
ethical aspects of such investments. According to The Economist Intelligence
Unit, areas of concern for foreign investors include: the lack of investment
protection and guarantees; absence of sources of financing; a severely
overvalued official exchange rate; inadequate telecommunication and
transport facilities; shortages of energy, spare parts and supplies; worker
motivation; and internal problems in Cuba, in terms of civil rights and the
relations between Cuba and the United States."
A.

The U.S. Embargo

Because of Castro's confiscation of property owned by foreigners and
Cubans alike and his strong support of violent revolution throughout South
and Central America, the United States imposed a full trade embargo on
Cuba on February 3, 1962. The legal foundation for the U.S. economic
embargo on Cuba rests on the Cuban Assets Control Regulations 5' promulgated in 1963 pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917.52 The
embargo has played an important role for the past thirty-three years in
relations between the two countries. The embargo could be lifted if the
claims against the Cuban government by U.S. citizens and nationals are
satisfied.53
In addition, Cuba must have a democratic form of
government.'
The Cuban government considers the embargo to be a
blockade that should be lifted as soon as possible since it views the embargo
as an act of aggression against Cuba.5 5 The ultimate decision on the
embargo could come from not only the United States but from Cuba as well.
B. Human Rights
Every totalitarian government has its own unique characteristics, and the
Castro regime is no exception. Over 1.5 million exiles, hundred of thousands
of political prisoners, and thousands of executions are the result of this

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

& HAINES, supra note 24, at 1-150.
31 C.F.R. § 515 (1963).
50 U.S.C. §§ 1-44 (1994).
22 U.S.C. § 2370(a)(2) (1994).
22 U.S.C. § 6007 (1994).
Law No. 851 (adopted by the Cuban Council of Ministers in 1960).
JENKINS
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regime. A retired Colonel in the U.S. Army and a graduate of the Army War
College of the United States, Esteban M. Beruvides, has published a book
titled Cuba and Its Martyrs, documenting executions in Cuba. Over one
hundred pages containing fifty-five hundred names are devoted to just a
partial listing of those who paid the maximum price at the hands of the
system in power. Each entry gives a person's name and place of birth, and
day and place of execution.5 6
The Cuban government treats those who speak against it very harshly.
Cuba's record on human rights is one of the most sensitive issues that
international companies must address if they plan to do business with Cuba.
It can have an effect on labor relations in Cuba and a company's image in
their own country.
According to Human Rights Watch, the Cuban government violates the
right of freedom of association, freedom of expression, and freedom from
arbitrary detention.57 Estimates of the current number of political prisoners
range from 700 to 1200, with political offenses including activities such as
clandestine printing and disrespect to the head of the state.5 8 Human Rights
Watch says Cuba should stop harassing human rights monitors, political
activists, and labor organizers.5 9 It might be good for business if they did
0
6

SO.

C.

Moral and Ethical Questionsfor ForeignInvestors

Assuming that the future political risks of investing in Cuba are
compensated by short term economic returns, there are still moral and ethical
issues that stockholders and officers of those firms must factor in the decision
to invest. Currently, the hiring of employees is done by the government,
who performs a political background check before sending them on to the
foreign firm. 6' The workers are paid in devalued Cuban pesos even though
the government collects U.S. dollars. 62 Collective bargaining between
workers and the foreign firms is not permitted.63 Once workers are
employed, they are subject to special legislation that allows management to
dismiss workers for the most insignificant error.' Once terminated, they

56. ESTEBAN M.

BERUVIDES, CUBA Y sus

MARTiREs 83-188 (1993).

57. Moneyline: CubanHuman Rights Record Affects InternationalTrade, (CNN television
broadcast, June 1, 1995), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CNN File.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. National Association of Independent Economists of Cuba, New Year, New Life, FREEMARKET CUBA Bus. J., Spring 1995, at 4.

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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must wait a minimum of five years before being allowed to return to
work.6 5 These hiring and working conditions place the Cuban worker at an
enormous disadvantage and raise the greatest moral and ethical issues for a
foreign firm as employer.
D. Claims Against the Cuban State
Prospective investors have to be aware that there are claims against the
Cuban State based on the expropriations of the late 1950s and early 1960s.
There are policy statements by the U.S. government indicating that the trade
embargo on Cuba will not be lifted until there has been a satisfactory
resolution of claims on the part of U.S. citizens and nationals. Cuban
expatriates and U.S. claim-holders demands ranged from restitution of lost
properties to full compensation. The Castro regime uses these claims and the
U.S. policy on the embargo to encourage fear of mass evictions or relegation
to second class status if there were a change in government.66 Future
external financing from multilateral financial institutions might also be
blocked by the United States. This policy is important not only in terms of
present investments, but as part of a meaningful national reconciliation in
Cuba.
E.

The FinancialSystem

For all practical purposes, the financial system in Cuba is non-existent,
that is, typical financing sources are not available in Cuba. Financial systems
should provide three key services: risk sharing, liquidity, and information.
These services make financial claims attractive to savers and can lower the
cost of financing to borrowers. In the case of Cuba, the lack of these
services becomes an additional cost that the investors have to absorb or pass
on to the consumer.
There also is a high-risk premium in investing in Cuba. A risk premium
is the additional return an investor needs to make in order to justify a risky
investment as compared with another investment with less risk. Although,
the major component of the risk premium reflects default risk, differences in
liquidity and information costs also are important. 67 The effect of information costs on the risk premium is high in Cuba. High information costs
reduce the efficiency of financial markets, presenting a problem of adverse

65. Id.
66. Rolando H. Castaneda & George Plinio Montalvan, Transition in Cuba: A
Comprehensive Stabilization Proposal and Some Key Issues, in CUBA IN TRANSITION 24, 24
(1993).
67. R. GLENN HUBBARD, MONEY, THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, AND THE ECONOMY 150-67
(1994).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1994

13

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 9, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 4

[Vol. 9

selection and moral hazard due to the need to monitor the use of funds after
the loan or investments have been made.68
In the case of liquidity, given the weakness of the Cuban peso, all
transactions should be in dollars. Trading in dollars makes it more expensive
for Cubans, because the only way to produce dollars is to export goods or
through some other type of business arrangement with investors who are at
a disadvantage to the Cuban government. Liquidity preference is the theory
that investors usually want some of their holdings to be held in highly liquid
assets, on which they are willing to take a lower return. This is another
reason why the returns in Cuba have to be higher for the investor.69
Liquidity is often needed to make near-term payments to take advantage of
temporary price reductions and to handle other short-term disbursements.70
However, in Cuba the investors must provide their own liquidity needs since
they do not have a financial system to which they can apply for short-term
funds.
Investors who want to sell all or part of their equity in their Cuban
venture also may experience a number of difficulties. Potential problems
include finding a buyer other than the government and getting payment in
dollars or another convertible currency. 71 It follows that the investor would
require a higher projected return on the investment, given the low level of
liquidity.
Another risk that must be considered in the Cuban case is the political
risk of the investment. There is political risk in every nation, but the degree
of risk varies widely. In the case of Cuba, the unknown future and lack of
consistency over the years make the political risk high. Risks include
whether the property being used for the investment is one that was
expropriated from its owners a number of years ago and whether the facilities
being used belong to someone else?
Another major political risk in Cuba involves possible conflict and
violent change. An investor would be wise to think twice before conducting
business in a country in which the likelihood of such change is high. The
expected duration of the investment is important, as a short-term investment
in Cuba is at less risk than a long-term investment. It also should be
remembered that in 1959 Cuba attacked foreign multinationals corporations
as remnants of the Western-dominated past. What would stop the current
government from repeating itself? What would stop a future government
from undoing what the current government has done today?

68.
69.
1995).
70.
71.

See HUBBARD, supra note 67, at 150.
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Companies investing in Cuba are significantly exposed to the risk of the
involuntary loss of control over specific assets without adequate compensation brought about by expropriation of property, war, revolution, or any
other change that brings the current government to an end. A new
government might totally or partially expropriate property and bring about
a forced divestiture, or might confiscate the existing investment. 2
F. Foreign Debt
The Cuban debt to the former Soviet Union in 1990 fluctuated between
US$8.7 and US$27.5 billion depending on the exchange rate. In June 1990,
Cuba owed the former Soviet Bloc, that is, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria,
Hungary, and East Germany, between US$2.5 and US$1.3 billion, depending
on the exchange rate. The above debt is in non-convertible currency. An
additional debt of US$6.7 billion in hard currency was owed to the whole
3
eastern bloc in November 1990.1
Cuba has an additional hard currency debt of over US$7.5 billion,
excluding accrued interest.74 As of March 31, 1994, Cuba owed $2.2
billion to the Paris Club government, $1.6 billion to other governments, $2.2
billion to banks, and $1.5 billion in other commercial debts.7 5
In the opinion of Cubans, it is necessary to take into account the damage
inflicted on the Cuban economy when the Soviet Union stopped fulfilling its
obligations under medium- and long-term agreements. Cubans also claim
that their economy suffered losses as a result of disruption of traditional trade
and economic relations. According to preliminary estimates on the Cuban
side, this damage tops the sum of Cuban debts to the former Soviet Union.
G. Infrastructure
In theory, Cuba's infrastructure appears attractive. With a transportation
system subsidized by the Soviets and built for defense, it can easily support
trade and commerce. According to the Cuban government, there are seven
thousand miles of paved roads, five thousand miles of rails, and eleven
deepwater ports, airports, and runways. These could be linked to support
modem production systems. But if a prospective investor were to spend any
significant time in Cuba, he would soon realize that Cuba's infrastructure
lacks quite a bit.
A shortage of energy has been one of the most crippling elements in the
economic crisis that hit Cuba after the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the

72. See id.
73. MESA-LAGO, supra note 23, at 232.

74. JENKINS & HAINES, supra note 24, at 75.
75. Id.
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corresponding cutoff of its main markets and sources of supply. Gasoline is
strictly rationed.76 Cubans use ration coupons to buy gas. However, those
with dollars can buy it without any problems. The fuel shortage keeps
transportation problematic and sometimes dangerous. Electricity also is
unreliable."
The only improvement from 1994 is that blackouts are
scheduled for certain days of the week, while previously they had been
sudden and frequent.
By some estimates, public transportation is only ten percent of what it
was in the late 1980s. Many commuters use bicycles. Others depend on the
overcrowded and slow bus system or look for rides on anything that
moves.7" Havana's public transportation service has been cut by forty
percent since 1989.
Industry is running at fifty to seventy percent of what is was in 1989, and
a chronic energy shortage is causing difficulties in the production process.79
Cuba has been deficient over the past thirty years in creating new housing to
meet existing demands. The housing situation is rapidly deteriorating due to
a lack of maintenance and a doubling of the population in the last thirty
years.
V.

CURRENT ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REALITIES FOR INVESTING

After the initial steps taken over the last few years to open up the staterun economy, officials have concluded that Cuba needs much more reform
to revive an economy that has shrunk by half in the last five years. The
reforms up to June 1995, have led to expectations of much more
liberalization in the economy. However, at the same time the government
hesitates out of fear that such deep economic reforms could lead to a
population no longer dependent on the state for its well-being, culminating
in a loss of political control.
Cuba has legalized trade in dollars, liberalized foreign investment, and
authorized limited selling in food markets after farmers fulfill their quotas.
It has turned many state-run farms into worker cooperatives, allowing a
limited free market to perform. Finally, it has imposed taxes on the
population.
Another reality which must not be forgotten is that while Cuba does have
a basic infrastructure in place, high-tech machinery and equipment are key

76. Howard LaFranchi, Cuba: Prideand Indifference, Hope and Hopelessness Exist Sideby-Side in this Nation of Paradoxes, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 29, 1996, at 9.
77. See Robert Walzer et al., Notes from Havana: Cubans Pursue a Tenuous Economic
Balancing Act, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 1996, at A14.
78. See Arturo Villar, The Americas: The Dollarizationof the Cuban Economy, WALL ST.
J., July 9, 1993, at A9.
79. See Walzer et al., supra note 77, at A14.
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elements needed to complement modem advancements. The Cuban economy
is still struggling with the maintenance of the existing infrastructure, which
remains in decline. Thus, an investor cannot assume that an infrastructure
that could complement their production line is currently available.
Plans for a real reduction in the number of state industrial and state
service employees have been circulating for many months. Again ,the
government talks about policies but does not have any policy in place that
people can use to make plans for the future. Proposals to offset the expected
cuts, such as allowing private employment, have been delayed by concerns
over what a larger, private workforce would mean for "Fidelista" Cuba.
Ricardo Alarc6n, Cuba's National Assembly President, has repeatedly
stated that "[w]e are not going to make the mistake of building capitalism at least that is not our intention. ,80 A number of Cuba's elite agree that
further economic reforms are necessary. However, only a small minority
favor going in a democratic direction to bring about economic and political
1
change."
New laws designed to make rules for foreign investment clearer and
simpler are expected, but the real debate is on massive layoffs of state jobs
and proposals to expand legal private employment.8 2 According to Julio
Carranza, Deputy Director of Cuba's Center for Study of the Americas, the
reforms will create two important changes. 3 First, Cuba will become less
become less
egalitarian, and second, a segment of the population will
4
self-employment.8
of
rise
the
to
due
state
the
dependent on
According to Mr. Alarc6n, the government is preparing to legalize small
family-operated businesses and allow some professionals to work as
Cuba also is planning to tax the private small enterprises,
consultants.8
such as restaurants and boarding houses.8 6 These taxes and license fees
would provide a new source of revenue for a government badly in need of
cash. 7 If implemented, Cuba's new policy will set a precedent in a country
where only foreigners are allowed to invest in and own businesses. The
government plans to keep tight control on these new private enterprises. For
instance, business owners would not be allowed to hire workers and would
have to submit to rigorous state inspections and record keeping. 8
Another part of the Cuban economy that has been deteriorating for a

80.
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83.
84.
85.
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87.
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number of years is agriculture. One of the problems that the present
government has had almost since its beginning is its inability to feed the
people. Even though Cuba, famous for its sugar, coffee, and tobacco, is
blessed with rich soil and a steady supply of water, it has suffered significant
drops in production. Due to mismanagement in the agricultural sector, a new
production system must be devised to rectify the lack of pesticides, fertilizers,
fuel, and machine parts. Cuba's food production has plunged by half.
The livestock sector also has been significantly hit, thus making milk and
beef luxury items.8 9 The Castro government has never been able to fulfill
its number one priority to be self sufficient in milk production.9" In 1989,
Cuba received more than 22,000 tons of powdered milk and huge quantities
of canned milk, equivalent to four hundred million liters, from East Germany
and other communist countries. 9 In 1993, Cuba's Agricultural Ministry
revealed that the country's 7 million head of cattle had dropped to 4.8
million, half the total number of cattle that were in Cuba in 1956.92
According to experts, the sector's recovery depends on raising diseaseresistant breeds that are adaptable to the local climate; a process that will
take years and depends on a change in mentality among dairy farmers and
an opening up to foreign capital. 93
Cuba has made changes to boost production, such as breaking state farms
in smaller cooperatives and allowing farmers to sell surplus produce at
farmers' markets. Critics say the cooperatives are neither small enough nor
independent enough. Even though Cuba presently is incorporating a number
of international partners in their agricultural production process, most critics
think that Cuba's best alternative is to embrace more market-oriented
reforms. They say that without further change, the farm sector will continue
to hamper Cuba's economic recovery.
A basic question concerns whether the partial economic reforms that
preserve a major role for the state are enough to achieve economic growth?
94
According to Antonio Jorge, Cuba continues to be a "rudderless society.,
It lost its bearings thirty-six years ago. The nation's leader is a caudillocacique, who doubles as Magus and Prophet. 95 It is useless to try to make

89. Dalia Acosta, Cuba-Agriculture:No More Fat Cows, Inter Press Serv., May 30, 1995,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INPRES File.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Antonio Jorge, An Objectless Revolution: Cuba's Nominal Socialism as a Personal
Project, 43 INTER-AMERICAN REV. BIBLIOGRAPHY, 187 187-98 (1995).
95. Antonio Jorge, Ideology, Planning, Efficiency and Growth: Change Without
Development, in CUBAN COMMUNISM, 1959-1995, at 313, 313 (Irving L. Horowitz ed., 8th
ed. 1995).
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96
economic sense of what is essentially his personal political project.
To the extent that this highly personal approach to the exercise of
authority results in the implementation of singular decisions and policy
courses, the basic question of the degree of autonomy allowed in the
economic system in the Cuba remains a crucial one. Power to define highpriority actions cannot be abstracted from the institutional nature, logical
character, and capacity for efficiency of an economic system. The nature and
impact of many of Castro's frequent interventions on the working of the
economic system, whether through economic-ideological considerations,
special economic projects, or major changes in political policy have been
amply documented by avowed sympathizers of the Cuban revolution as well
as by more neutral academic observers.97
At the passing of Castro, a qualitative change hopefully will take place.
Cuba may change into a more conventional state with a markedly inwardlooking approach, and by extension, a substantially greater concern for
economic rationality and the utilitarian calculus. Castro's Cuba is inherently
incapable of implementing the structural changes that the Cuban economy
needs. Cuba requires economic resources for modernization and a reorientation of production to the consumers' needs; these are things that Cuba's
subsistence economy cannot even dream of starting. Liberalization assumes
a level of decentralization and intermediation in the economy. This is a
98
society to which Castro will not and cannot consent.

VI.

CONCLUSION

The economic reforms that Cuba is carrying out do not represent a longterm strategy with the purpose of achieving a new economic model. These
reforms are merely short-term steps specifically aimed at the political survival
of the regime. In order to buy time, Cuba is seeking an economic plateau
that will allow the system to survive. In order to save itself, the government
is desperately looking everywhere for the equivalent of the US$2 to US$3
billion in annual subsidies that it previously received from the Soviet Union.
The Castro regime, through its official public statements and timid
economic reforms, has conveyed the image of a regime that is determined to
preserve its essential political and economic foundation. This foundation
includes collective ownership of property, a leading economic role for the
state, and principles of socialist distribution of goods. Politically, the regime
96. Id.
97. See Antonio Jorge & Jaime Suchlicki, Cuba: The Failure of Socialism, in CUBA,
CONTINUITY, AND CHANGE 59, 59-82 (Jaime Suchlicki et al. eds., 1985).
98. Antonio Jorge, The Political Economy of the Cuban Revolution: Why the System
Failed, Why Piecemeal Reform Will Not Succeed, in CUBA IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra
note 28, at 69, 69-95.
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continues to reject calls for a democratic transition that would include
political parties, a free press, and free elections.
Economically, there have been signs of a cooling in the investment
interest in Cuba by foreign firms. The U.S. Congress' tightening the
embargo through the Cuban Liberty and Democratic-Solidarity Act of 1996 99
and Havana's own hesitation in implementing a new investment law that
would allow up to 100% foreign-owned business ventures have contributed
the cooling off of foreigners' initial interest in investment.

99. Pub. L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091 (Supp.
1996)).
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